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Abstract
We consider the problem of reliably broadcasting information in a multihop asynchronous
network that is subject to Byzantine failures. Most existing approaches give conditions for
perfect reliable broadcast (all correct nodes deliver the authentic message and nothing else),
but they require a highly connected network. An approach giving only probabilistic guarantees
(correct nodes deliver the authentic message with high probability) was recently proposed for
loosely connected networks, such as grids and tori. Yet, the proposed solution requires a specific
initialization (that includes global knowledge) of each node, which may be difficult or impossible
to guarantee in self-organizing networks – for instance, a wireless sensor network, especially if
they are prone to Byzantine failures.
In this paper, we propose a new protocol offering guarantees for loosely connected networks
that does not require such global knowledge dependent initialization. In more details, we give
a methodology to determine whether a set of nodes will always deliver the authentic message,
in any execution. Then, we give conditions for perfect reliable broadcast in a torus network.
Finally, we provide experimental evaluation for our solution, and determine the number of
randomly distributed Byzantine failures than can be tolerated, for a given correct broadcast
probability.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we study the problem of reliably broadcasting information in a network that is
subject to attacks or failures. Those are an important issue in a context where networks grow
larger and larger, making the possibility of failure occurrences more likely. Many models of failures
and attacks have been studied so far, but the most general model is the Byzantine model [11]: some
nodes in the network may exhibit arbitrary behavior. In other words, all possible behaviors must
be anticipated, including the most malicious strategies. The generality of this model encompasses
a rich panel of security applications.
In the following, we assume that a correct node (the source) broadcasts a message in a network
that may contain Byzantine nodes. We say that a correct node delivers a message, when it considers
that this actually is the message broadcasted by the source.
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Related works. Many Byzantine-robust protocols are based on cryptography [3, 5]: the nodes
use digital signatures or certificates. Therefore, the correct nodes can verify the validity of received
informations and authenticate the sender across multiple hops. However, this approach weakens the
power of Byzantine nodes, as they ignore some cryptographic secrets: their behavior is not totally
arbitrary. Moreover, in some applications such as sensor networks, the nodes may not have enough
resources to manipulate digital signatures. Finally, cryptographic operations require the presence
of a trusted infrastructure, such as secure channels to a key server or a public key infrastructure.
In this paper, we focus on non-cryptographic and totally distributed solutions: no element of the
network is more important than another, and all elements are likely to fail.
Cryptography-free solutions have first been studied in completely connected networks [11, 1,
12, 13, 17]: a node can directly communicate with any other node, which implies the presence
of a channel between each pair of nodes. Therefore, these approaches are hardly scalable, as
the number of channels per node can be physically limited. We thus study solutions in partially
connected networks, where a node must rely on other nodes to broadcast informations.
Dolev [4] considers Byzantine agreement on arbitrary graphs, and states that for agreement
in the presence of up to k Byzantine nodes, it is necessary and sufficient that the network is
(2k + 1)-connected and the number of nodes in the system is at least 3k + 1. Also, this solution
assumes that the topology is known to every node, and that nodes are scheduled according to the
synchronous execution model. Nesterenko and Tixeuil [19] relax both requirements (the topology is
unknown and the scheduling is asynchronous) yet retain 2k+ 1 connectivity for resilience and k+ 1
connectivity for detection (the nodes are aware of the presence of a Byzantine failure). In sparse
networks such as a grid (where a node has at most four neighbors), both approaches can cope only
with a single Byzantine node, independently of the size of the grid. More precisely, if there are two
ore more Byzantine nodes anywhere in the grid, there always exists a possible execution where no
correct node delivers the authentic message.
Byzantine-resilient broadcast was also investigated in the context of radio networks: each node
is a robot or a sensor with a physical position. A node can only communicate with nodes that are
located within a certain radius. Broadcast protocols have been proposed [10, 2] for nodes organized
on a grid. However, the wireless medium typically induces much more than four neighbors per
node, otherwise the broadcast does not work (even if all nodes are correct). Both approaches are
based on a local voting system, and perform correctly if every node has less than a 1/4pi fraction
of Byzantine neighbors. This criterion was later generalized [20] to other topologies, assuming that
each node knows the global topology. Again, in loosely connected networks, the local constraint on
the proportion of Byzantine nodes in any neighborhood may be difficult to assess.
A notable class of algorithms tolerates Byzantine failures with either space [15, 18, 21] or
time [14, 9, 8, 7, 6] locality. Yet, the emphasis of space local algorithms is on containing the fault
as close to its source as possible. This is only applicable to the problems where the information
from remote nodes is unimportant (such as vertex coloring, link coloring or dining philosophers).
Also, time local algorithms presented so far can hold at most one Byzantine node and are not able
to mask the effect of Byzantine actions. Thus, the local containment approach is not applicable to
reliable broadcast.
All aforementioned results rely on strong connectivity and Byzantine proportions assumptions in
the network. In other words, tolerating more Byzantine failures requires to increase the connectivity,
which can be a heavy constraint in a large network. To overcome this problem, a probabilistic
approach for reliable broadcast has been proposed in [16]. In this setting, the distribution of
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Byzantine failures is assumed to be random. This hypothesis is realistic in various networks such as
a peer-to-peer overlays, where the nodes joining the network are not able to choose their localization,
and receive a randomly generated identifier that determines their location in the overlay. Also, it
is considered acceptable that a small minority of correct nodes are fooled by the Byzantine nodes.
With these assumptions, the network can tolerate [16] a number of Byzantine failures that largely
exceeds its connectivity. Nevertheless, this solution requires to define many sets of nodes (called
control zones [16]) before running the protocol: each node must initially know to which control
zones it belongs. This may be difficult or impossible in certains types of networks, such as a
self-organized wireless sensor network or a peer-to-peer overlay.
Our contribution. In this paper, we propose a broadcast protocol performing in loosely con-
nected networks subject to Byzantine failures that relaxes the aforementioned constraint – no
specific initialization is required for the nodes. This protocol is described in Section 2. Further, we
prove general properties on this protocol, and use them to give both deterministic and probabilistic
guarantees.
In Section 3, we give a sufficient condition for safety (no correct node delivers a false message).
This condition is not based on the number, but on the distance (with respect to the number of
hops) between Byzantine failures. Then, we give a methodology to construct – node by node – a
set of correct nodes that will always deliver the authentic message, in any possible execution.
In Section 4, we consider a particular loosely connected network: the torus, where each node
has exactly four neighbors. We give a sufficient condition to achieve perfect reliable broadcast on
such a network (all correct nodes deliver the authentic message).
In Section 5, we make an experimental evaluation of the protocol on grid networks. We give a
methodology to estimate the probability that a correct node delivers the authentic message, for a
given number of Byzantine failures. This way, we can determine the maximal number of failures
that the network can hold, to achieve a given probabilistic guarantee.
2 Description of the protocol
In this section, we provide an informal description of the protocol. Then, we precise our notations
and hypotheses, and give the algorithm that each correct node must follow.
2.1 Informal description
The network is described by a set of processes, called nodes. Some pairs of nodes are linked by a
channel, and can send messages to each other: we call them neighbors. The network is asynchronous:
the nodes can send and receive messages at any time.
A particular node, called the source, wants to broadcast an information m to the rest of the
network. In the ideal case, the source would send m to its neighbors, which will transmit m to their
own neighbors – and so forth, until every node receives m. In our setting however, some nodes –
except the source — can be malicious (Byzantine) and broadcast false informations to the network.
Of course, a correct node cannot know whether a neighbor is Byzantine.
To limit the diffusion of false messages, we introduce a trigger mechanism: when a node p
receives a message m, it must wait the reception of a trigger message to accept and retransmit m.
The trigger message informs p that another node, located at a reasonable distance, has already
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Figure 1: Illustration of the trigger mechanism
accepted m. This distance is the number H of channels (or hops) that the trigger message can
cross. This is illustrated in Figure 1-a.
The underlying idea is as follows: if the Byzantine nodes are sufficiently spaced, they will
never manage to broadcast false messages. Indeed, to broadcast a false message, a Byzantine node
requires an accomplice to broadcast the corresponding trigger message (see Figure 1-b). However,
if this accomplice is distant from more than H + 1 hops, the trigger message will never reach its
target, and the false message will never be accepted (see Figure 1-c).
2.2 Notations and Hypotheses
Let (G,E) be a non-oriented graph representing the topology of the network. G denotes the nodes
of the network. E denotes the neighborhood relationship. A node can only send messages to its
neighbors. Some nodes are correct and follow the protocol described thereafter. We consider that
all other nodes are totally unpredictable (or Byzantine) and may exhibit an arbitrary behavior.
Hypotheses We consider an asynchronous message passing network: any message sent is even-
tually received, but it can be at any time. We assume that, in an infinite execution, any process
is activated inifinitely often. However, we make no hypothesis on the order of activation of the
processes. Finally, we assume local topology knowledge: when a node receives a message from a
neighbor p, it knows that p is the author of the message. Therefore, a Byzantine node cannot
lie about its identity to its direct neighbors. This model is referred to as the “oral” model in the
literature (or authenticated channels).
Messages formalism In the protocol, two types of messages can be exchanged:
• Standard messages, of the form (m): a message claiming that the source broadcasted the
information m.
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• Trigger messages, of the form (m,S): a message claiming that a node has delivered m. The
set S should contain the identifiers of the nodes visited by this message.
The protocol is characterized by a parameter H ≥ 1: the maximal number of hops that a trigger
message can cross. Typically, this limit is reached when S contains more than H − 1 nodes. This
parameter is known by all correct nodes.
Local memories Each correct node p maintains two dynamic sets, initially empty:
• Wait: the set of standard messages received, but not yet accepted. When (m, q) ∈ Wait, it
means that p received a standard message (m) from a neighbor q.
• Trig: set of trigger messages received. When (m,S) ∈ Trig, it means that p received a
trigger message (m,S − {q}) from a neighbor q.
Vocabulary We will say that a node multicasts a message when it sends it to all its neighbors.
A node delivers a message m when its consider that it is the authentic information broadcast by
the source. In the remaining of the paper, we call D the shortest number of hops between two
Byzantine nodes. For instance, D = 4 in Figure 1-b, and D = 5 in Figure 1-c.
2.3 Local Execution of the Protocol
Initially, the source multicasts m and (m, ø). Then, each correct node follows these three rules:
• RECEPTION – When a standard message (m) is received from a neighbor q: if q is the
source, deliver m, then multicast (m) and (m, ø); else, add (m, q) to the set Wait.
• TRANSMISSION – When a trigger message (m,S) is received from a neighbor q: if q /∈ S
and card(S) ≤ H − 1, add (m,S ∪ {q}) to the set Trig and multicast (m,S ∪ {q}).
• DECISION – When there exists (m, q, S) such that (m, q) ∈Wait, (m,S) ∈ Trig and q /∈ S:
deliver m, then multicast (m) and (m, ø).
3 Protocol Properties
In this section, we give conditions about the placement of Byzantine nodes that guarantee network
safety (that is, no correct node ever delivers a false message). Then, we give a methodology to
compute a set of nodes that always delivers authentic messages, in any possible execution. Remind
that correct nodes do not know the actual positions of Byzantine nodes.
3.1 Network Safety
The following theorem guarantees network safety, provided that Byzantine node are sufficiently
spaced. This condition depends on the parameter H of the protocol, and on the distance D (see
2.2). We also show that the condition on D is tight for our protocol.
Notice that safety does not guarantee that correct nodes actually deliver the authentic message.
This aspect is studied in 3.2.
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Theorem 1 (Network Safety) If D ≥ H + 2, no correct nodes delivers a false message.
Proof: The proof is by contradiction. Let us suppose the opposite : D ≥ H + 2, and at least one
correct node delivers a false message. Let u be the first correct node to deliver a false message, and
let m′ be this message.
No correct node can deliver m′ in RECEPTION, as the source did not send m′. So u delivered
m′ in DECISION, implying that there exists q and S such that (m′, q) ∈ u.Wait, (m′, S) ∈ u.Trig
and q /∈ S.
The statement (m′, q) ∈ u.Wait implies that u received (m′) from a neighbor q in RECEPTION.
Let us suppose that q is correct. Then, q sent (m′) in DECISION, implying that q delivered m′.
This is impossible, as u is the first correct node to deliver m′. So q is necessarily Byzantine.
Now, let us prove the following property Pi by recursion, for 1 ≤ i ≤ H + 1: a correct node ui,
at i hops or less from q, received a message (m′, Si), and card(S) = card(Si) + i.
• First, let us show that P1 is true. The statement (m′, S) ∈ u.Trig implies that u received
(m′,X ) from a neighbor x in TRANSMISSION, with S = X ∪ {x} and x /∈ X , So card(S) =
card(X ) + 1. Therefore, P1 is true if we take u1 = u and S1 = X . Besides, it is also necessary
that card(X ) ≤ H − 1, so card(S) ≤ H.
• Let us suppose that Pi is true, with i ≤ H. The node ui received (m′, Si) from a node x,
so x is at i+ 1 hops or less from q. Let us suppose that x is Byzantine. Then, according to
the previous statement, D ≤ i+ 1 ≤ H + 1, contradicting our hypothesis. So x is necessarily
correct.
Node x could not have sent (m′, Si) in RECEPTION or DECISION, as u is the first correct
node to deliver m′. So this happened in TRANSMISSION, implying that x received (m′,Y)
from a node y, with Si = Y ∪ {y} and y /∈ Y. So card(Si) = card(Y) + 1, and card(S) =
card(Y) + i+ 1. Therefore, Pi+1 is true if we take ui+1 = x and Si+1 = Y.
Overall, PH+1 is true and card(S) = card(SH+1) + H + 1 ≥ H + 1. But, according to a previous
statement, card(S) ≤ H. This contradiction completes the proof. 2
As a complementary result, let us show that the bound D ≥ H + 2 is tight for our protocol.
Theorem 2 (Tight bounds for safety) If D = H + 1, some correct nodes may deliver a false
message.
Proof: Let b and c be two Byzantine nodes distant from H + 1 hops. Let (p0, ..., pH+1) be a path
of H + 1 hops, with p0 = b and pH+1 = c. Then, b can send a standard message (m
′) to p1, and c
can send the trigger message for m′ trough H hops. Therefore, it is possible that p1 delivers the
false message, and the network is not safe. 2
3.2 Network Reliability
Here, we suppose that the safety conditions determined in Section 3.1 are satisfied: no correct node
can deliver a false message. We now give a methodology to construct a set S of nodes that always
delivers the authentic message.
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Definition 1 (Reliable node set) For a given source node and a given distribution of Byzantine
nodes, a set of correct nodes S is reliable if all nodes in S eventually deliver authentic messages in
any possible execution.
Definition 2 (Correct path) A N -hops correct path is a sequence of distinct correct nodes
(p0, . . . , pN ) such that, ∀i ≤ N − 1, pi and pi+1 are neighbors.
Notice that, according to RECEPTION (see 2.3), the set formed by the source and its correct
neighbors is reliable. The following theorem permits to decide whether a given node p can be added
to a reliable set S. So, a reliable set can be extended node by node, and can potentially contain
the majority or the totality of the correct nodes.
Theorem 3 (Reliable set determination) Let us suppose that the hypotheses of Theorem 1
(Network Safety) are all satisfied. Let S be a reliable node set, and p /∈ S a node with a neighbor
q ∈ S. If there exists a correct path of H hops or less between p and a node v ∈ S (all nodes of the
path being distinct from q), then S ∪ {p} is also a reliable node set.
Proof: Let m be the message broadcast by the source. As the hypotheses of Theorem 1 are
satisfied, the correct nodes can only deliver m. As q and v are in a reliable node set, there exists a
configuration where q and v have delivered m. This implies that q and v have multicast (m) and
(m, ø).
So p eventually receives (m) from q. If q is the source, p delivers m, completing the proof.
Now, let us suppose that q is not the source. Then, p eventually adds (m, q) to its set Wait in
RECEPTION.
Let (v0, . . . , vN ) be a N -hops correct path, with v0 = v, vN = p and N ≤ H. Let Si be the
set of nodes defined by S0 = ø and Si = {v0, . . . , vi−1} for 1 ≤ i ≤ N . Let us prove the following
property Pi by induction, for 0 ≤ i ≤ N − 1: Node vi eventually multicasts (m,Si).
• P0 is true, as v0 = v has multicast (m, ø).
• Let us suppose that Pi is true, with i ≤ N − 2. Let e be an execution where vi has multicast
(m,Si). Then, vi+1 eventually receives (m,Si). According to TRANSMISSION, as card(Si) ≤
H − 1 and vi /∈ Si, vi+1 eventually multicast (m,Si+1). Therefore, Pi+1 is true.
So PN−1 is true and vN−1 eventually multicasts (m,SN−1). Therefore, p eventually receives
(m,SN−1). According to TRANSMISSION, as card(SN−1) ≤ H − 1 and vN−1 /∈ SN−1, (m,SN−1)
is eventually added to p.Trig. Thus, we eventually have (m, q) ∈ p.Wait, (m,SN−1) ∈ p.Trig and
q /∈ SN−1. So according to DECISION, p eventually delivers m. 2
4 A Reliable Torus Network
In this section, we refined the general conditions given in section 3 for the particular case of torus
networks. Torus is good example of a multihop sparse topology, as every node has exactly four
neighbors, and is sufficiently regular to permit analytical reasoning.
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Figure 2: Example of grid network: a 7× 7 grid
4.1 Preliminaries
We first recall the definition of the torus topology:
Definition 3 (Torus network) A N ×N torus network is a network such that:
• Each node has a unique identifier (i, j) with 1 ≤ i ≤ N and 1 ≤ j ≤ N .
• Two nodes (i1, j1) and (i2, j2) are neighbors if and only if one of these two conditions is
satisfied:
– i1 = i2 and |j1 − j2| = 1 or N .
– j1 = j2 and |i1 − i2| = 1 or N .
Tori vs grids. If we remove the “or N” from the previous definition, we obtain an arguably more
realistic topology: the grid. A grid network can easily be represented in a bidimensional space (see
Figure 2).
However, no general condition on the distance between Byzantine nodes can guarantee reliable
broadcast in the grid. Indeed, let us suppose that the node (2, 2) is the source, and that the node
(1, 2) is Byzantine. Then, the node (1, 1) has no way to know which node tells the truth between
(1, 2) and (2, 1).
To avoid such border effects, we consider a torus network in this part. The grid will be studied
in Section 5, with an experimental probabilistic study.
4.2 A sufficient condition for reliable broadcast
The main theorem of this section guarantees network safety, again in terms of spacing Byzantine
nodes apart. This condition depends on the parameter H of the protocol, and on the distance D
(see 2.2). We also show that the condition on D is tight for our protocol.
Theorem 4 (Torus reliable broadcast) Let T be a torus network, and let the parameter of the
protocol be H = 2. If D ≥ 5, all correct nodes eventually deliver the authentic message.
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Proof: According to Theorem 1, as H = 2 and D ≥ 5, no correct node ever delivers a false message.
In the sequel, the expression proof by exhaustion designates a large number of trivial proofs that
we do not detail, as they present no particular interest.
If the dimensions of the torus are 5× 5 or less, the proof of reliable broadcast is by exhaustion:
we consider each possible distribution of Byzantine nodes, and use Theorem 3 to show that all
correct nodes eventually deliver the authentic message. Now, let use suppose that the dimensions
of the torus are greater than 5× 5.
Let v be any correct node. Let (u1, . . . , un) be a path between the source s and v. If this path
is not correct, we can easily construct a correct path between s and v. Indeed, as D ≥ 5, there
exists a square correct path of 8 hops around each Byzantine node. So, for each Byzantine node ui
from the path, we replace ui by the correct path linking ui−1 and ui+1. Therefore, we can always
construct a correct path (p1, . . . , pn) between s and v.
For a given node p, we call G3×3(p) the 3× 3 grid from which p is the central node (2, 2), and
G5×5(p) the 5 × 5 grid from which p is the central node (3, 3). We want to prove the following
property Pi by induction: all correct nodes of G3×3(pi) eventually deliver the authentic message.
• We prove P1 by exhaustion: we consider each possible distribution of Byzantine nodes in
G3×3(s) with D ≥ 5, and use Theorem 3 to show that all correct nodes eventually deliver the
authentic message.
• Let us suppose that Pi is true. G3×3(pi+1) contains pi and at least two of its neighbors. As
D ≥ 5, at least one on these neighbors q is correct. As pi and q are also in G3×3(pi), they
eventually deliver the authentic message, according to Pi.
– Let us suppose that there is no Byzantine node in G3×3(pi+1). Then, we prove Pi+1
by exhaustion: we consider each possible distribution of Byzantine nodes in G3×3(pi+1)
with D ≥ 5, and use Theorem 3 to show that all correct nodes eventually deliver the
authentic message.
– Let us suppose that there are some Byzantine node in G3×3(pi+1). According to our
hypothesis, there is at most one Byzantine node b in G3×3(pi+1). Then, all correct
nodes of G3×3(pi+1) are in G5×5(b) – so, in particular, pi and q. As D ≥ 5, b is the
only Byzantine node in G5×5(b). Then, we prove Pi+1 by exhaustion: we consider each
possible placement of pi and q in G5×5(b), and use Theorem 3 to show that all correct
nodes of G5×5(b) – and thus, all correct nodes of G3×3(pi+1) – eventually deliver the
authentic message.
So Pn is true, and v = pn eventually delivers the authentic message.
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As a complementary result, let us show that the bound D ≥ 5 is tight for our protocol.
Theorem 5 (Torus tight bounds) If D = 4, some correct nodes may never deliver the authentic
message.
Proof: Let T be a N × N torus network, with N ≥ 8. Let us consider the example given in
Figure 3, where D = 4. In this figure, the central node s is the source node. As they are direct
neighbors of the source, the node of type 1 eventually deliver the authentic message. However, the
nodes of type 2 never do so.
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Figure 3: Critical case in a torus network
Indeed, let us consider a node p of type 2, and its neighbor q of type 1. To deliver the authentic
message, p needs to receive a trigger message from another node of type 1, by a correct path of H
hops that does not contain q. But, as H = 2, such a path does not exist. Besides, we cannot take
H > 2, as it would enable some correct nodes to deliver a false message, according to Theorem 2.
Therefore, the nodes of type 2 – and thus, the other correct nodes – will never deliver the authentic
message.
2
Finally, let us discuss possible extensions to a grid-shaped network. We have seen that perfect
reliable broadcast was impossible in a grid, due to border effects. However, it is actually possible
in a sub-grid extracted from the grid.
More precisely, let G be a N ×N grid, and G′ a sub-grid containing all the nodes (i, j) of G such
that 4 ≤ i ≤ N − 4 and 4 ≤ j ≤ N − 4. Then, the proof of Theorem 4 is also valid for G′.
It is also the case if we consider any particular node in an infinite grid (but not all nodes). In
other words, a given correct node eventually delivers the authentic message, even if the notion of
perfect reliable broadcast does not make sense in an infinite network.
5 Experimental evaluation
In this section, we target quantitative Byzantine resilience evaluation when considering the case of
randomly distributed Byzantine failures. We first give a methodology to estimate the number of
Byzantine failures that a particular network can tolerate for a given probabilistic guarantee. Then,
we present experimental results for a grid topology.
Notice that only the placement of Byzantine failures is probabilistic: once this placement is
determined, we must assume that the Byzantine nodes adopt the worst possible strategy, and that
the worst possible execution may occur.
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Figure 4: Experimental evaluations on N ×N grid networks
5.1 Methodology
Let nB be the number of Byzantine failures, randomly distributed on the network (the distribution
is supposed to be uniform). We would like to evaluate the probability P (nB), for a correct node,
to deliver the authentic message. For this purpose, we use a Monte-carlo method:
• We generate several random distributions of nB Byzantine failures.
• For each distribution, we randomly choose a source node s and a correct node v. Then, we
use Theorem 3 to construct a reliable node set (see Definition 1). If v is in the reliable node
set, it eventually delivers the authentic message, and the simulation is a success – else, it is
a failure.
• With a large number of simulations, the fraction of successes will approximate P (nB).
More precisely, we approximate a lower bound of P (nB), as the reliable node set constructed
in not necessarily the best. Therefore, we can determine a maximal number of Byzantine failures
that can be tolerated for a given guarantee (for instance: P (nB) ≥ 0.99).
5.2 Results
We run simulations on N ×N grid networks, with a parameter H = 2 for the protocol. The results
are presented in Figure 4.
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As expected, a larger grid can tolerate more Byzantine failures, as they are more likely to be
sufficiently spaced.
To our knowledge, the only existing protocol working on such a sparse topology – without
specific initialization of the nodes – is Explorer [19]. This protocol consists in a voting system on
node-disjoint paths between the source and the peers. However, as a node has at most 4 neighbors,
2 Byzantine failures can prevent any correct node to deliver the authentic message. Therefore, no
guarantee can be given for more than 1 Byzantine failure.
As in [16], we could have modified Explorer and forced it to use predetermined paths on the
grid. However, this would require global topology knowledge. More precisely, in order to use such
a tweaked version of Explorer, a node must know its position on the grid and, for a given neighbor,
whether it is its upper, lower, left or right neighbor. Those assumptions are not required with our
protocol.
On this grid topology, our protocol enables to tolerate more than 1 Byzantine failure with a
good probability. For instance, for N = 500, we can tolerate up to 14 Byzantine failures with
P (nB) ≥ 0.99 (see Figure 4).
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a Byzantine-resilient broadcast protocol for loosely connected networks
that does not require any specific initialization of the nodes, nor global topology knowledge. We
gave a methodology to construct a reliable node set, then sufficient conditions for perfect reliable
broadcast in a sparse topology: the torus. Finally, we presented a methodology to determine the
number on randomly distributed Byzantine failures that a network can hold.
Several interesting open questions remain. First, we have the strong intuition that the condition
proved on the torus could be generalized to any network topology. Another challenging problem is to
obtain theoretical probabilistic guarantees, based on global network parameters such as diameter,
node degree or connectivity. Third, the tradeoff between global knowledge and the number of
Byzantine nodes that can be tolerated requires further attention.
References
[1] H. Attiya and J. Welch. Distributed Computing: Fundamentals, Simulations, and Advanced
Topics. McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, New York, May 1998. 6.
[2] Vartika Bhandari and Nitin H. Vaidya. On reliable broadcast in a radio network. In Mar-
cos Kawazoe Aguilera and James Aspnes, editors, PODC, pages 138–147. ACM, 2005.
[3] Miguel Castro and Barbara Liskov. Practical byzantine fault tolerance. In OSDI, pages 173–
186, 1999.
[4] D. Dolev. The Byzantine generals strike again. Journal of Algorithms, 3(1):14–30, 1982.
[5] Vadim Drabkin, Roy Friedman, and Marc Segal. Efficient byzantine broadcast in wireless
ad-hoc networks. In DSN, pages 160–169. IEEE Computer Society, 2005.
12
[6] Swan Dubois, Toshimitsu Masuzawa, and Se´bastien Tixeuil. The impact of topology on byzan-
tine containment in stabilization. In Proceedings of DISC 2010, Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, Boston, Massachusetts, USA, September 2010. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg.
[7] Swan Dubois, Toshimitsu Masuzawa, and Se´bastien Tixeuil. On byzantine containment prop-
erties of the min+1 protocol. In Proceedings of SSS 2010, Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
New York, NY, USA, September 2010. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg.
[8] Swan Dubois, Toshimitsu Masuzawa, and Se´bastien Tixeuil. Bounding the impact of un-
bounded attacks in stabilization. IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
(TPDS), 2011.
[9] Swan Dubois, Toshimitsu Masuzawa, and Se´bastien Tixeuil. Maximum metric spanning tree
made byzantine tolerant. In David Peleg, editor, Proceedings of DISC 2011, Lecture Notes in
Computer Science (LNCS), Rome, Italy, September 2011. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg.
[10] Chiu-Yuen Koo. Broadcast in radio networks tolerating byzantine adversarial behavior. In
Soma Chaudhuri and Shay Kutten, editors, PODC, pages 275–282. ACM, 2004.
[11] Leslie Lamport, Robert E. Shostak, and Marshall C. Pease. The byzantine generals problem.
ACM Trans. Program. Lang. Syst., 4(3):382–401, 1982.
[12] D. Malkhi, Y. Mansour, and M.K. Reiter. Diffusion without false rumors: on propagating
updates in a Byzantine environment. Theoretical Computer Science, 299(1–3):289–306, April
2003.
[13] D. Malkhi, M. Reiter, O. Rodeh, and Y. Sella. Efficient update diffusion in byzantine envi-
ronments. In The 20th IEEE Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems (SRDS ’01), pages
90–98, Washington - Brussels - Tokyo, October 2001. IEEE.
[14] Toshimitsu Masuzawa and Se´bastien Tixeuil. Bounding the impact of unbounded attacks
in stabilization. In Ajoy Kumar Datta and Maria Gradinariu, editors, SSS, volume 4280 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 440–453. Springer, 2006.
[15] Toshimitsu Masuzawa and Se´bastien Tixeuil. Stabilizing link-coloration of arbitrary networks
with unbounded byzantine faults. International Journal of Principles and Applications of
Information Science and Technology (PAIST), 1(1):1–13, December 2007.
[16] Alexandre Maurer and Se´bastien Tixeuil. Limiting byzantine influence in multihop asyn-
chronous networks. IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
(ICDCS), 2012.
[17] Y. Minsky and F.B. Schneider. Tolerating malicious gossip. Distributed Computing, 16(1):49–
68, 2003.
[18] Mikhail Nesterenko and Anish Arora. Tolerance to unbounded byzantine faults. In 21st Sym-
posium on Reliable Distributed Systems (SRDS 2002), pages 22–29. IEEE Computer Society,
2002.
13
[19] Mikhail Nesterenko and Se´bastien Tixeuil. Discovering network topology in the pres-
ence of byzantine nodes. IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems (TPDS),
20(12):1777–1789, December 2009.
[20] Andrzej Pelc and David Peleg. Broadcasting with locally bounded byzantine faults. Inf.
Process. Lett., 93(3):109–115, 2005.
[21] Yusuke Sakurai, Fukuhito Ooshita, and Toshimitsu Masuzawa. A self-stabilizing link-coloring
protocol resilient to byzantine faults in tree networks. In Principles of Distributed Systems, 8th
International Conference, OPODIS 2004, volume 3544 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 283–298. Springer, 2005.
14
